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Abstract
The equilibrium of a two-stage conflict game with side-payments predicts that with
binding stage-one offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating
settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer
nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments
reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more
egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency,
although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 98% of efficiency gains come from
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1. Introduction
Though we hope it needs no explanation, our title is drawn from a famous scene in The
Godfather in which Marlon Brando’s character, the head of the Corleone crime family, sends his
trusted aide to Los Angeles to convince an intransigent movie producer to give his godson a role
in an upcoming film. Don Corleone offers to help the producer deal with the unions in exchange
for this favor, but when the producer refuses, the Don suggests they “make him an offer he can’t
refuse” and beheads his prized horse. Having experienced the gravity of underestimating Don
Corleone’s insistence, the producer acquiesces and the dealings are concluded without further
bloodshed. Perhaps the producer believed that the Don could not commit to limiting his demands
to the one request and that he would renege in the future. However, had the producer accepted
Don Corleone’s offer in the first place, costly conflict could have been avoided altogether.
The pervasive threat of conflict in human history has yielded much effort in identifying
and adopting institutions and social conventions that prevent conflict.1 Here we step back and
look at the most basic means of avoiding conflict – paying off one’s enemies. We develop and
test with laboratory experiments a simple model of conflict avoidance via side payments. We
show that when agents can bargain before a conflict, resource transfers are sufficient to render
fighting unnecessary, so long as agents can commit themselves to respect the agreement.
However, in experiments we observe deviations from the theory in two major ways: 1) when
commitment not to fight is guaranteed by accepting a transfer, side payments are less effective at
reducing conflict than predicted, but 2) when the decision to enter the fight is not tied to the
decision to accept, the ability to offer side payments nevertheless reduces the costs of conflict.
The potential applications of this knowledge are as broad as conflict is ubiquitous in
human social life. The use of side payments to avoid conflict can be observed in diverse
situations such as countries offering foreign aid to potential belligerents to stave off violence and
parents bribing their children to avoid a tantrum. Empirical evidence suggests that families share
or offer gifts of food and other items to non-related individuals to deter theft. For example,
Schechter (2007) reports that 42 percent of rural Paraguayan households admit giving gifts to
potential thieves in the hopes that these untrustworthy people will thereby be deterred from
1

Samuel Pufendorf (1672) explains one such example, the invention of property rights, as follows: “[W]e may
hence too discover the Falsity of that Vulgar Saying, Mine and Thine are the cause of all the Wars and Quarrels in
the World. For on the contrary the Distinction of Mine and Thine was rather introduc’d to prevent all Contention.”
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stealing. And it is well-known that most legal disputes are not resolved in court, but rather
through pre-trial settlement (Bebchuk, 1984; Schweizer, 1989). Furthermore, hold-up by either
or both parties causes the majority of settlements occur close to the trial date, indicating
substantial rent-seeking (Spier, 1992).
We model conflict as a variation of the classic Tullock (1980) rent-seeking contest
between two agents. Before the conflict arises, however, one participant may offer an ultimatumlike side payment to the other in order to avoid the contest. We show that when the side payment
creates a binding commitment not to enter into the conflict, it is optimal for first-movers to pay
off their opponents, resulting in an efficient but unequal division of the surplus. On the other
hand, if the side payment does not create a binding commitment, first-movers should never offer
a side payment, and second-movers who are offered a payment should always accept and then
engage in conflict anyway.
Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce the costs of conflict
relative to a baseline in which side-payments are not possible. However, roughly 30% of subjects
reject these binding offers, and the mean observed offer is much closer to egalitarian than
predicted. Furthermore, contrary to the theoretical equivalence of the baseline and non-binding
cases, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although not as much as in the
binding case. With binding side-payments, 98% of efficiency gains result from avoiding
conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 49% of the gains come from avoided
conflicts. The remainder results from reduced conflict expenditures, suggesting that non-binding
side-payments help reduce conflict in two ways, despite the incentives to exploit those who
attempt to employ them.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly review the
literature on conflicts and conflict resolution; in section 3 we detail our theoretical results;
section 4 describes our experimental design, procedures and hypotheses; section 5 analyzes the
results of the experimental sessions; and section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review
The formal analysis of conflicts and conflict resolution originated with Schelling’s (1960)
masterpiece Strategy of Conflict. Schelling was one of the first to use game theoretical examples
in raising important questions about problems of credible commitment in conflict resolution or
3

conflict avoidance situations. One such example demonstrates that in the absence of well-defined
property rights, conflicts may lead to extremely inefficient outcomes (Myerson, 2009). Hence
this argument raises an important question about how rational agents can commit themselves to
costly threats in order to avoid such inefficient equilibria.
Probably the most well-known example of inefficient conflicts is rent-seeking. In the
original rent-seeking contest proposed by Tullock (1980), agents expend resources in order to
win a prize. The winner is chosen probabilistically: the probability of winning equals the agent’s
expenditure divided by the sum of all agents’ expenditures. The main message of the theoretical
rent-seeking literature is that conflicts are very costly, and when they occur, they lead to wasteful
expenditures of resources.2 Moreover, recent experimental literature reveals that conflicts are
even more costly than predicted by the theory. In particular, it is well documented that in
laboratory experiments subjects’ expenditures are higher than the Nash equilibrium predictions
in magnitudes ranging from 50% to 200%. This over-competition is reduced with repetition of
the experiment, but it does not disappear (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta
Forthcoming; Sheremeta 2010b).3
Given the high costs of conflict identified in the theoretical and experimental literature it
is imperative to understand how conflicts can be reduced (Schelling, 1966). Some previous
literature on conflict resolution describes several ways to reduce conflicts through contracting
(Hirshleifer, 1995; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000, 2007). In Hirshleifer’s terminology, conflict
can be reduced or eliminated through vertical or horizontal contracts. The former is best thought
of as hierarchical domination of one party by another and the latter as contractual arrangement
among equals (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007). Ultimately, both solutions rely on binding
contracts and credible commitments. The common underlying feature of conflict resolution
models is that agents have bargaining powers that depend on their expected payoffs from the
open conflict (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; Anbarci et al., 2002; Esteban and Sakovics,

2

For a review of the theoretical literature see Konrad (2009). It is important to emphasize that some researchers
have focused on cases in which the contest expenditures are not wasteful from the point of view of a third-party, e.g.
contest designer, as in labor contests designed by firm owners to maximize employee effort (e.g. Lazear and Rosen,
1981, O’Keeffe, et al., 1984, Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). However, this interpretation relies on the presence of an
external observer and the assumption that elicited effort contributes to something other than the contest itself. From
the point of view of the individuals involved in the contest, expenditures may still remain wasteful.
3
A number of studies have proffered explanations for overbidding in rent-seeking contests based on bounded
rationality, misperception of probabilities and joy of winning (for a review see Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010).
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2006).4 Depending on relative bargaining power, conflicting parties can contract to avoid a
potential conflict. Extensions of these theories have demonstrated that the feasibility of avoiding
conflict may also depend on a number of other factors, such as the presence of a third party, the
shadow of the future, or arms control (Che and Gale, 1998; Gavious et al., 2002; Frazier and
Dixon, 2006).5
In the current study, we investigate whether conflicts can be avoided through sidepayments. Linster (1994) describes how side payments can eliminate or minimize rentdissipation in repeated Tullock contests. Jackson and Winkie (2005) show conditions under
which the inherent inefficiency of various games (e.g. Cournot competition and the tragedy of
the commons) can be mitigated with binding, strategy-contingent side payments. However, they
emphasize that in equilibrium such side payments need not be efficient and may in fact create
inefficiencies of their own. Muthoo (2004) describes a repeated game in which side payments
expand the set of equilibria in which costly conflict can be avoided. Charness et al. (2007)
provide experimental evidence that subjects use side payments in order to transform Prisoner's
Dilemma games into coordination games. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) analyze auctions in
which negative externalities are imposed on losing entrants and describe circumstances under
which side payments can mitigate the losses from competition. Other studies of side-payments
analyze such transfers in the context of bribery (Abbink et al., 2002; Abbink, 2004; Büchner et
al., 2008).
Here we explore how side payments can create incentives to avoid costly conflict in oneshot Tullock contests. In our setting, one party can make an offer (binding or non-binding) to
another party in order to avoid a conflict. The other party then chooses to accept or reject the
offer. In the binding case, if the second-mover accepts the offer, then the prize goes to the firstmover; otherwise, the two parties engage in the standard Tullock contest. Thus, our binding case
creates an environment in which subjects participate in an ultimatum bargaining game (e.g.
Hoffmann and Spitzer 1985, Guth and Tietz 1990), where the disagreement point is a Tullock
contest. As we will see later, this relationship to the ultimatum game has important implications
4

Similar ideas are well known in the literature on territorial disputes among non-human animals (Parker, 1974).
Frazier and Dixon (2006) document that presence of a third party increases the probability of settlement. Schelling
and Halperin (1961) argue that arms control treaties should result in less resource allocation towards military goods
and, should conflict arise, lower destruction rates. Although recent theoretical findings by Che and Gale (1998) and
Gavious et al. (2002), suggest that imposing caps (arms control) in the rent-seeking contest can surprisingly lead to
increased spending.
5
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for subject behavior in this environment. Our more important innovation here comes in the nonbinding case, where the side-payment offer is (theoretically) non-binding. If the second-mover
accepts the offer, he may still choose to participate in the Tullock contest in the second stage,
even after he has received his side payment. Hence, at one extreme a cooperative second-mover
may choose to convert the conflict game into an ultimatum game by accepting a side-payment
and then choosing not to enter, and at the other extreme an untrusting first-mover can unilaterally
assure that bargaining results in the disagreement point. In the next section we analyze this game
theoretically.

3. Theoretical Model
Consider a potential conflict situation between two players for a prize valued at v by both
players. We define the conflict situation in two sequential stages, the bargaining stage and the
conflict stage. In the bargaining stage, player 1 can offer a side payment s to player 2 in order to
avoid the conflict stage. If player 2 accepts the side payment offer, then the game ends with
neither player advancing to the conflict stage. Player 2 receives a payoff of π2 = s while player 1
receives a payoff of π1 = v - s. However, if in the bargaining stage, player 2 rejects the side
payment offer, then both players advance to the conflict stage in which they compete in an allpay contest to determine who receives the prize.6
We model the conflict stage according to Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking contest. In such a
contest, two risk-neutral players make irreversible expenditures e1 and e2 in an attempt to receive
a prize value v. Player i’s probability of winning is defined by a contest success function
(Skaperdas, 1996):
pi(e1, e2) = ei /(e1 + e2).

(1)

The expected payoff for a risk-neutral player i is equal to the probability of player i
winning, pi(e1, e2), times the prize valuation, v, minus contest expenditure, ei:
E(πi) = pi(e1, e2)v - ei.

(2)

By differentiating (2) and solving the best response functions simultaneously, we obtain
the following unique Nash equilibrium expenditure levels for players 1 and 2:
6

It is important to emphasize that the results of our model may change if players first choose to invest in armaments
(i.e., make bids first) and only then enter the bargaining stage (i.e., offer a contract). Moreover, we could alter the
results by introducing collateral damage due to conflict, such as a partial destruction of the prize (Garfinkel and
Skaperdas, 2000; Skaperdas, 2006).

6

e1* = e2* = v/4.

(3)

Given the equilibrium expenditures (3), the expected payoffs of players 1 and 2 from the
contest are:
E(π1*) = E(π2*) = v/4.

(4)

Clearly, the contest is socially costly because all resources invested in the conflict stage
are wasted. It is also individually costly to the loser, so both players, having complete knowledge
of the game’s structure and its incentives, may prefer to avoid the conflict stage by offering side
payments in the bargaining stage. However, for a side payment to be acceptable to its recipient,
the amount of the transfer must at least provide compensation equal to the expected payoff from
entering the conflict. Thus, to prevent player 2 from entering the conflict, player 1 should
optimally offer a side payment equal to s* = E(π2*) = v/4, and since such a side payment provides
player 2 with the same payoff she expects to earn in the conflict, she should accept the side
payment, thereby avoiding the conflict. In such a case, player 1’s equilibrium payoff is π1* = v s* = 3v/4, player 2’s payoff is π2* = s* = v/4, and the total surplus is Π* = π1* + π2* = v. Notice
that side payments are efficient since by avoiding the conflict stage, the players waste no
resources in the contest. However, payoffs with side payments are far from equitable; the payoff
to player 1 is three times higher than that of player 2.
The argument thus far was based on the assumption that side payment contracts in the
bargaining stage are binding, i.e. if player 2 accepts the side payment, then she renounces any
further claim to the prize and may not choose to enter the conflict stage. However, we now ask
how the result changes when the side payment creates a non-binding contract. When the side
payment is non-binding, player 2 chooses simultaneously in the bargaining stage whether to
accept the side payment s and also whether to enter the conflict stage. Since playing the
equilibrium strategy in the contest yields an additional expected payoff of E(π2*) = v/4, player 2
should always accept any side payment and then still choose to enter the conflict stage. Thus,
knowing that player 2 cannot be dissuaded from conflict in the bargaining stage, player 1 will
never offer a side payment, i.e. s* = 0, and the game will always reach the conflict stage. As a
result, there is efficiency loss due to resource expenditures in the contest. 7 Thus, equilibrium

7

Here we assume that a side payment is a sunk cost for player 1. Thus, when player 2 accepts the side payment in
the bargaining stage, player 1 cannot reclaim it in the conflict stage. However, if the side payment is added to the
prize value and can be reclaimed in the conflict stage then a non-binding contract becomes effectively binding.
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total surplus in the non-binding case is Π* = E(π1*) +E(π2*) = v/2, equivalent to the outcome in
the original rent-seeking contest without side payments. As before, the loss of the surplus comes
from expenditures in the conflict, i.e. e1* = e2* = v/4.
Hence, our theory provides two very distinct predictions depending on the form of the
side-payment contract employed in the bargaining stage. Side payments that bind recipients not
to enter the conflict stage should always be offered at a rate equal to the expected value from the
contest, and they should always be accepted, thereby eliminating conflict and its attendant
efficiency losses. On the other hand, if the contract is non-binding, then no side payment should
ever be offered since the recipient will always accept and then enter the conflict anyway. The
results of our model stress the importance of rule of law and paint a bleak picture of prospects for
reducing conflict in the absence of mechanisms for contract enforcement.8 When contracts
cannot be enforced and parties may renege (as is frequently the case in many societies), our
model predicts that conflict over resources will be ubiquitous and costly.9 To compare the
predictions of the theory to the behavior of motivated human subjects, we turn to a laboratory
experiment.

4. Experimental Design and Procedures
We employ three treatments to test the predictions of our theory: Baseline, Binding, and
Non-Binding. The outline of the experimental design and the theoretical predictions for each
treatment are shown in Table 1. In the Baseline treatment, players 1 and 2 are exogenously
placed into a conflict situation, where they expend resources in order to receive a prize value v =
60. This treatment replicates previous experimental work on one-shot Tullock contests and
provides us a basis for comparison of our new treatments’ effects on subject behavior. The
equilibrium prediction in the Baseline treatment is that both players will expend 15 and each will
receive on average a payoff of 15.
The other two treatments, Binding and Non-Binding introduce the bargaining stage to the
game, prior to the conflict stage. In the bargaining stage of the Binding treatment, player 1

8

We note that enforcement mechanisms usually have costs of their own that we do not model here, and if those
costs are sufficiently high, not even binding contracts can eliminate conflict.
9
Recall that previous experiments have shown that individuals display a persistent tendency to over-invest in
conflict, so the absence of enforcement may be even more costly than our model suggests.
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(hereafter the Proposer) can make a binding side payment offer s to player 2 (hereafter the
Responder). If the Responder accepts the offer, then she receives a payoff of s and the Proposer
receives the payoff of 60 - s. The equilibrium prediction in the Binding treatment is that the
Proposer will make an offer of s = 15 and the Responder will accept the side payment, thereby
avoiding the conflict. Finally, in the Non-Binding treatment the side payment offer s by the
Proposer is non-binding, i.e. the Responder chooses simultaneously whether to accept the side
payment and also whether to enter the conflict stage. Hence, the Responder may accept a side
payment and nevertheless enter the conflict. Since the side payment contract is non-binding, the
equilibrium offer of the Proposer is s = 0. In this case conflict ensues with probability 1. The
outcome is identical to the Baseline game with no bargaining stage.
However, previous experimental work in bargaining (Hoffmann and Spitzer 1985, Guth
and Tietz 1990) and conflicts (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998) suggests that some
aspects of the theoretical predictions are not likely to be borne out by the data. In particular,
conflict, should it occur, is likely to be more costly than predicted by the theory. Hence, the
results in the bargaining stage could be impacted in a number of ways. For example, knowing
that conflict is unlikely to yield a large expected payoff, Responders in the Binding treatment
may be willing to accept side-payments even lower than predicted by the theory. On the other
hand, if Responders frequently reject offers close to their indifference point (as is observed in
many Ultimatum games), then Proposers might increase their offers to Responders to induce
higher acceptance rates.
Each experimental session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment in which subjects
were randomly and anonymously re-matched in each period. In each of the side-payment
treatments, subjects were randomly assigned the initial role of either Proposer or Responder,
where the Proposer made either a binding offer (Binding treatment) or a non-binding offer (NonBinding treatment) to the Responder in the bargaining stage. Subjects remained in this role for
the first 15 periods of the session, and then all Proposers became Responders and vice versa for
the final 15 periods. At the end of each experimental session, subjects completed a brief
demographic survey. To reinforce the one-shot incentives of the game, subjects knew beforehand
that we would select five of the 30 periods for payment using a bingo cage; subjects’ earnings
from these five periods were added to or subtracted from an initial endowment of 600 (which we
described as a participation fee). We converted endowments to USD at a rate of 30 = $1, and
9

subjects were paid privately in cash and dismissed from the experiment. Sessions lasted roughly
an hour each.
Subjects (44% male, average age = 20) were recruited at random from the undergraduate
student body of a private university in the United States to participate in 9 experimental sessions
with 12 subjects each.10 Subjects sat at, and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals,
and instructions were read aloud by the experimenter as subjects followed along on paper.
Subjects received their initial endowments of 600 ($20) for arriving to the experiment on time
and received their earnings in cash privately at the end of each 90-minute session. The average
experimental earnings, including the $20 participation fee, were $22.00, ranging from a low of
$15.75 to a high of $26.75. No subject participated more than once, and no subject had prior
experience with a similar experimental environment. Instructions for the Non-Binding treatment
are included in an appendix. Instructions for the other treatments are available upon request.

5. Results
5.1. Surplus
We will proceed by exploring the relation between our experimental data and the
theoretical predictions listed in Table 1. Then, where our observations make it necessary, we will
attempt to explain deviations from the theory and differences between the treatments. For all
statistical analysis we use panel regressions with subject specific random effects. In all
estimations we control for learning (of which we find scant evidence), order of play, and session
effects. First, we compare the treatments to the theory by total surplus produced and individual
conflict expenditures.
Finding 1: In all three treatments, surplus is smaller than predicted by the theory.
However, both Binding and Non-Binding side-payments increase surplus relative to the Baseline;
although, the effect is much larger for the Binding treatment.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the three treatments. Theory predicts a total
surplus of 30 for each pair in the Baseline, 60 in the Binding, and 30 in the Non-Binding
treatment (see Table 1). Observe that in the Baseline treatment, the average joint surplus for the
two individuals is only 1.4, which is significantly lower than the theoretical surplus of 30 (p10

There were only 10 subjects in two of our baseline sessions, for a total of 104 subjects in all sessions.
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value < 0.01).11 In the Binding and Non-Binding treatments, the average surplus is 42.8 and 18.7,
respectively, which are both lower than the theoretical predictions of 60 and 30 (p-values <
0.01). As expected, the greatest surplus is produced by the employment of Binding side-payment
contracts. However, surprisingly, Non-Binding side-payments also substantially increase surplus
relative to the Baseline.12

5.2. Conflict Expenditures and Sources of Efficiency Improvement
Having established differences between the three treatments, we look deeper into the data
to explain the sources of efficiency improvement in the Binding and Non-Binding cases. Figure 1
displays histograms with Gaussian kernel density estimations detailing the distribution of
conflict expenditure by treatment, conditional on participation in the conflict.13 In the Baseline
treatment, average individual conflict expenditure is 29.3. In the side-payment treatments with
Binding and Non-Binding contracts, average conflict expenditures are 26.5 and 24,
respectively.14
These observations replicate previous experimental results demonstrating that conflict is
extremely inefficient and costly. It is important to emphasize that, although subjects in all
treatments fight with greater intensity than theory predicts, conflict expenditures are lower in the

11

To support these conclusions we estimate simple panel regressions separately for each treatment, where the
dependent variable is the surplus (payoff) and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend, and a dummy
variable to control for role-switching in period 15. The models included a random effects error structure, with the
individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. The
standard errors were clustered at the session level. Based on a standard Wald test conducted on estimates of each
model, we found that surplus (payoff) in the Baseline, Binding, and Non-Binding treatment is significantly lower
than predicted (all p-values < 0.01).
12
We estimated several random-effect regressions of surplus (payoff) on the treatment dummy variables, a time
trend, and a dummy variable to control for role-switching in period 15. All three pair-wise comparisons indicate that
the surplus is the Binding treatment is higher than the surplus in the Non-Binding and Baseline (both p-values <
0.01). Similarly, the surplus in the Non-Binding treatment is significantly higher than the surplus in the Baseline
treatments (p-value < 0.01). In all regressions, a random effects error structure accounted for the multiple decisions
made by individual subjects and standard errors were clustered at the session level to account for session effects.
13
All graphics were created using R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing (2010) and a
contributed package (Warnes, Bolker and Lumley 2008). We employ the standard rule-of-thumb from Scott (1992)
to select our kernel bandwidth.
14
Note that the distribution of expenditures is flatter in the Baseline and Non-Binding treatments than in the Binding
treatment, indicating that subjects make less variable bids after rejecting a binding contract. This observation is
consistent with Eriksson et al. (2009) who find, in a rank-order tournament, that the between-subject variance is
lower when subjects self-select into the tournament than when the tournament is imposed exogenously.
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Binding and Non-Binding treatments than in the Baseline.15 However, taken alone, these
reductions in conflict expenditure are insufficient to account for observed efficiency
improvements. In the side payment treatments, increased surplus is also due to lower rates of
entry into conflict. To identify the relative impact of these two effects, we decompose the
sources of efficiency improvement.
Table 3 displays the average surplus gains in each of the side-payment treatments relative
to the Baseline and shows what portion of those gains are due to non-entry into conflict and what
portion are due to conflict de-escalation. Let Πk be the total average surplus earned in treatment
k, k  {Baseline, Binding, Non-Binding}, where Πk = E(π1) + E(π2). Let ∆Πk = Πk - ΠBaseline be
the average surplus gain in treatment k relative to the Baseline. Now, let Pk be the probability of
avoiding conflict in treatment k, and recall that the average available surplus is v = 60. The
average surplus gain from non-entry in treatment k is defined as vPk, and the percentage of gains
due to non-entry is (vPk/Πk)×100%.
Finding 2: In the Binding treatment, 98% of the increase in surplus is due to reduced
entry into conflict. However, in the Non-Binding treatment, only 49% of the gains are due to
reduced entry.
The Binding treatment induces 68% of pairs to avoid conflict; hence almost all of the
surplus gains (98.6%) result from decisions not to enter the conflict stage. On the other hand, the
gains in the Non-Binding treatment come both from reduced entry (48.6%) and from reduced
expenditures in conflict (51.4%). The ability to employ Non-Binding side payments induces pairs
to avoid conflict 14% of the time because some Responders make side payments binding by
choosing not to enter the conflict stage. However, Non-Binding payments also lead subjects to
reduce their conflict expenditures.
Why do subjects in the Non-Binding treatment reduce their expenditures in conflict?
There are a number of competing hypotheses. For example, if the offers serve as cooperative
signals by Proposers to Responders, one would expect that there is a negative correlation
between the size of the offer and the amount of conflict expenditure for both parties. If Proposers
set aside a fixed budget that they are willing to allocate to conflict, then again we would expect

15

Based on the random-effect regression analysis, the expenditures in the Baseline are significantly higher than in
the Non-Binding and Binding treatments (p-value=0.07 and p-value=0.07). However, there is no significant
difference between the Non-Binding and Binding treatments (p-value=0.42).
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the size of their offer to be negatively correlated with their conflict expenditures, or similarly, if
Responders treat Proposers’ offers as subsidies to their conflict investment, then one would
expect a positive correlation between offers and Responders’ expenditures. On the other hand, if
Proposers fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy, one would expect a positive correlation between
offers and Proposers’ expenditures.
Table 4 reports average non-zero offers and associated conflict expenditures in the NonBinding treatment, conditional on the decision to accept or reject the offer. In the cases in which
the Responder chooses to accept a non-zero offer (mean offer = 14.9) and also to enter the
conflict, we find that the average expenditures by Proposer and Responder are 24.9 and 22.9.
However, for rejected non-zero offers (mean offer = 9.1), average conflict expenditures increase
to 26.8 for Proposers and 28.6 for Responders. This gives some credence to the signaling
hypothesis. Furthermore, a regression of conflict expenditures on offers, controlling for whether
the Responder accepted the offer, shows a significant negative effect of offer size for Proposers
(p-value < 0.01), which also supports the signaling hypothesis and, potentially, the budgeting
hypothesis.16 However, we find no significant effect of offer size on expenditures for Responders
(p-value = 0.29). It may be that more than one of the aforementioned effects is operating
simultaneously and that in some cases the effects are offsetting. Perhaps eliciting all decisions
simultaneously via the strategy method would better disambiguate these hypotheses because
signaling would no longer be possible. We suggest this for future research but do not explore this
possibility here. Next we analyze the conditions under which pairs in the side payment
treatments were able to avoid conflicts.

5.3. Accepted and Rejected Offers
Table 5 displays information about the number of offers, rejections, and conflicts avoided
in the Binding and Non-Binding treatments. A number of interesting observations emerge. First,
in both treatments, subjects reject roughly 30% of offers in the first stage. Second, in the Binding
treatment, every Proposer made a positive offer to the Responder, but in the Non-Binding
treatment, Proposers offered the predicted amount of zero in only 170/540 (31.5%) of the first
stage decisions. Finally, although theoretically there is no incentive to do so, Responders in the
16

As before, we estimate random effects by subject and cluster standard errors by session.
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Non-Binding treatment reject 43/370 (11.6%) of Proposers’ non-zero offers. All of these facts
help us to explain the gains from side payments, so to flesh them out we look more deeply into
the distribution of offers and the impact of offer size on Responders’ acceptance and entry
decisions.
To understand how and when subjects use side payments to avoid conflicts we examine
the characteristics of offers and their impact on Responders’ decisions to enter the conflict stage.
Figure 2 displays histograms of offers in the Binding and Non-Binding treatments. Similarly,
Table 6 contains summary statistics about the offers in the two treatments with side-payments.
We calculate the average offer, average accepted offer, average offer that led Responders not to
enter (in the Non-Binding treatment), and average rejected offer. First, we compare the average
offer in the Binding and Non-Binding treatments.
Finding 3: Both the average and the average accepted offers in the Binding treatment are
significantly higher than in the Non-Binding treatment. However, offers in both treatments are
higher than predicted by the theory.
Table 6 indicates that the average (accepted) offer in the Binding treatment is 26.2 (27.7),
or 75% (85%) greater than the theoretical prediction of 15, and the average (accepted) offer in
the Non-Binding treatment is 11 (14.3), though the theory predicts offers of 0.17 Furthermore, the
average offer in the Binding treatment is significantly higher than in the Non-Binding
treatment.18 Recall that in the Non-Binding treatment, subjects can still enter the conflict even
after accepting the offer. Therefore, the third row of Table 6 reports the average accepted offer in
the Non-Binding treatment, conditional on the Responder choosing not to enter. These instances
represent the cases in which subjects in the Non-Binding treatment chose to make the side
payments binding. Perhaps surprisingly, as with unconditional accepted offers, the mean
accepted offer of 27.7 in the Binding treatment is significantly higher than the mean accepted
offer, conditional on non-entry, of 24.8 in the Non-Binding treatment.19 One explanation is that

17

These offers are significantly higher than the predicted offers based on the estimation of panel regressions
separately for each treatment (all p-values < 0.01).
18
As before, a random effects error structure accounted for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects and
standard errors were clustered at the session level to account for the session effects.
19
The accepted offer in the Binding treatment is significantly higher than both conditional and unconditional
accepted offer in the Non-Binding based on the estimation of panel regressions, with offer being dependent variable
and treatment dummy and period trend being independent variables (p-value < 0.01 and p-value = 0.02, respectively
for unconditional and conditional accepted offers).
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the average unconditional offer in the Binding treatment is 26.2, and in the Non-Binding
treatment it is only 11.0 (see Table 2). Therefore, lower average unconditional offers in the NonBinding treatment may lower subjects’ expectations about the perceived appropriate conflictavoiding offer.
Although theory predicts the directional difference between the treatments, subjects in
both treatments offer more than expected. The regularity of excessive (relative to the theory)
offers may indicate peculiarities in the acceptance and rejection behavior of Responders. By
examining rejection rates we can further explore these possibilities.
Finding 4: Contrary to theoretical predictions, more than 30% of offers in the Binding
treatment are rejected, with an average rejected offer of 23.3. However, in weaker support of the
theory, the probability of accepting the offer is increasing in the offer size.
The theoretical prediction for the Binding treatment is that any offer greater than or equal
to 15 should be accepted because such offers exceed the expected gains from conflict. A weaker
implication of the theory is that the probability of accepting the offer will increase with the
amount of the offer, and indeed, we find support for this claim: an offer between 0 and 20 is
accepted with the probability of 0.17, an offer between 20 and 40 is accepted with the probability
of 0.69, and an offer between 40 and 60 is accepted with the probability of 1.00. Nevertheless,
Table 5 reports that more than 30% of offers are rejected in the Binding treatment. The average
rejected offer is 23.3 (Table 5), which is 55% larger than the offer predicted by the theory.
Hence, the rejection rate in the Binding treatment cannot be explained by insufficient offers
relative to the theoretical predictions. More likely, high offers result from the (expectation and
experience of) relatively high rejection rates, which we observe despite the fact that the average
payoff from conflict is negligible and much lower than the theoretical payoff of 15 (i.e. 0.7 in the
Baseline, 3.5 in the Binding treatment, and 6 in the Non-Binding treatment).20
What explains the high rejection rate and the fact that subjects frequently reject offers
larger than those predicted by the theory? First, we note that individual differences play a
significant role in Binding treatment rejection behavior. For example, we observe a strong
negative correlation between individuals’ offers when in the role of Proposer and their rejection
rates as Responders (r = -0.38, p-value = 0.02). However, this fact begs the question of why
some subjects prefer conflict to settlement. Previous experimental studies of contests have
20

We calculate these averages by subtracting the mean conflict expenditures from the value of the prize.
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demonstrated that subjects may receive utility from the simple fact of victory. In Sheremeta
(2010a; 2010b) subjects expend resources in lottery contests where the prize is worth nothing,
and the amount of that expenditure is equal to the amount by which they overbid relative to the
theory in other variations of the game where the prize has positive value. Furthermore, in the
classic “Dollar Auction” from Shubik (1971), individuals frequently bid and pay more than one
dollar for a dollar prize. Hence if subjects value victory then they may choose to engage in
conflict when it would be more efficient to accept the Proposer’s offer.21
A second explanation can be found in the aforementioned similarities between the
bargaining stage of our game and the standard ultimatum game, which we argue induces similar
behavioral tendencies. Replication upon replication has demonstrated a persistent tendency of
subjects to “irrationally” reject offers in ultimatum games; however, the debate about the source
of these rejections persists (e.g. Guth and Tietz 1990; Murnighan 2008). For example, in a wellknown study, Hoffman et al. (1994) demonstrate that allowing subjects to earn the right to be
first-movers in an ultimatum game both diminishes offers and decreases the rate of rejection.
Since in our experiment the roles of Proposer and Responder are randomly assigned (and not
earned or in any way tied to performance) subjects may be unwilling to accept offers that deviate
from their sense of propriety. In other words, high rejection rates could be a result of spiteful
responses to the perceived excessive exploitation of an unearned right. On the other hand,
subjects may make their rejections on the basis of preferences over the social distribution of
surplus. If, for example, subjects are inequality averse, then they may be unwilling to accept
offers that lead to unequal outcomes regardless of whence comes the right. Future research
should focus on how to test these hypotheses separately. However, even more puzzling and
intriguing is the high rejection rate in the Non-Binding treatment.
Finding 5: Contrary to theoretical predictions, 28% of offers in the Non-Binding
treatment are rejected, and the average rejected offer equals 2.4. Moreover, the probability of
accepting the offer and the probability of choosing to avoid conflict are increasing in offer size.
Although the theoretical prediction for the Non-Binding treatment is that any offer of any
size should be accepted, Table 5 reports that 28% of all offers are rejected. Moreover, the

21

More surprising are the few instances in which subjects reject theoretically acceptable offers and expend so much
in conflict that their earnings (assuming they win) are less than they would have received by accepting the offer.
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probability of accepting the offer and avoiding conflict are increasing in the offer size: when the
offer is between 0 and 20 the probabilities of acceptance and conflict avoidance are 0.66 and
0.09, when the offer is between 20 and 40 these probabilities are 0.96 and 0.33, and when the
offer is between 40 and 60 these probabilities are 1.00 and 0.46
The average rejected offer in the Non-Binding treatment is 2.4 (Table 6). There are a
number of possible explanations for such behavior. For example, knowing that they intend to
enter the second stage (for whatever reason), subjects that value honesty may choose not to
accept a transfer that they believe was sent in good faith with the goal of circumventing conflict.
Similarly a sense of nobility or desire for a “fair” fight would lead to rejections if accepting a
transfer is perceived as creating an imbalance of power, or one might also rationalize the
behavior by postulating inequality aversion.
Another explanation of our data is that rejections are intended as a form of
communication or signaling. The modal rejected offer is 0 and the mean rejected offer is 2.4
suggesting that most observed rejections are intended to be expressive. Subjects may reject
positive (but low) offers in hopes of signaling to others that for a sufficient offer, they would be
willing to avoid a conflict.22 While an individual should be economically indifferent between
accepting and rejecting an offer of 0, a rejection may constitute cheap talk through which a
Responder can signal displeasure with the offer. We find weak support for this hypothesis, as
subjects who reject offers of 0 expend 25.3 on average in the conflict stage, which is higher
(although not significantly) than the expenditure of 23.5 by subjects who accept offers of 0.
As in the Binding treatment, we note that individual differences play an important role in
rejection behavior. For example, in the Non-Binding treatment, we observe a significant and
positive correlation between subjects’ mean offers as Proposers and their rejection rates as
Responders (r = 0.40, p-value = 0.02) indicating that some subjects maintain a tendency to seek
and signal cooperative intent throughout the session.23 This interpretation finds additional
support in the positive and significant correlation between subjects’ offers as Proposers and their
rate of non-entry as Responders (r = 0.44, p-value < 0.01).
22

It is interesting that even with random re-matching, which guarantees that such a signal is extremely noisy, we
nevertheless observe that in 14% of cases these subjects receive sufficient offers and conflict is averted. This
suggests that endogenous or exogenous sorting and/or repeat play may further reduce the cost of conflicts with nonbinding side payments. Evidence of such effects for prisoner’s dilemmas and trust games already exists (e.g. Kahn
and Murnighan 2008; McCabe et al. 2007).
23
Note that the effect in the Non-Binding treatment is exactly the opposite of that in the Binding treatment.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we develop and test a theory of conflict resolution via side payments. In our
two-stage game, two agents interact in a conflict over a valuable resource. In the first stage, one
agent may make an ultimatum-style offer to the other agent who then chooses to accept or reject
the offer. In one case, accepting the offer binds the second-mover to not engage in a lottery
contest for the resource, and in the other case, second-movers choose to accept or reject the offer
and choose simultaneously whether to enter the conflict. While the theory predicts that only
binding side-payment contracts will be able to eliminate conflicts (i.e. the first stage offers that
bind their recipients not to engage in conflict), we find that even in cases in which individuals
have no reason to offer side-payments to avoid a conflict, the possibility of transfers reduces the
frequency and intensity of conflict. While binding contracts are not as effective as predicted by
the theory and while subjects who engage in conflict still overinvest, we find that non-binding
contracts are more effective than predicted and provide some measure of increased security
relative to a baseline without the possibility of transfers. In a world in which recourse to
exogenous enforcement mechanisms is frequently a luxury (and just as frequently, impossible),
this result suggests that the prospects for reducing conflict between individuals and nations is not
as bleak as the rational actor model suggests.
One additional virtue of this project is that the results suggest as many new questions as
they answer. In addition to the puzzles mentioned above, one could ask, for example, under what
conditions would the efficiency benefits of the Non-Binding treatment be eliminated? Or how
could Non-Binding contracts be made as efficient as Binding ones? How would asymmetries in
power affect the outcomes? How would communication impact the rate and intensity of conflict?
How would subjects behave in a repeated version of the game with the same counterpart, or in a
one-shot version of the game? We leave these questions open for future research.
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Table 1: Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions
Treatment
Player Baseline
Binding
Non-Binding
Side Payment, s*
1
–
15
0
Probability of a Conflict
2
1.00
0.00
1.00
1
15
15
15
Equilibrium Expenditure, e*
2
15
15
15
1
15
45
15
Expected Payoff, E(*)
2
15
15
15
Available Surplus, v
60
60
60
*
Equilibrium Surplus, 
30
60
30

Table 2: Average Individual Per Period Surplus and Expenditure by Treatment
Treatment
Player
Baseline
Binding
Non-Binding
Side Payment, s
1
–
26.2 (4.4)
11.0 (12.3)
Probability of a Conflict
2
1.00
0.32 (0.47)
0.86 (0.35)
1
29.3 (13.4)
26.0 (9.6)
24.1 (12.0)
Average Expenditure, e
2
29.3 (13.4)
27.1 (8.8)
23.9 (12.9)
1
0.7 (28.9)
22.7 (22.0)
4.7 (32.7)
Average Payoff, 
2
0.7 (28.9)
20.1 (20.4)
14.0 (30.5)
Total Surplus, Π
1.4
42.8
18.7
Standard deviation in parentheses.

Table 3: Average Gains from Side-Payments by Treatment
Treatment
Baseline
Binding
Non-Binding
Total Surplus, Πk
1.4
42.8
18.7
Surplus Gain, ∆Πk
0
41.4
17.3
Probability of Non-Entry, Pk
–
0.68
0.14
Surplus Gain From Non-Entry, vPk
–
40.8
8.4
% Gains From Non-Entry
–
98.6%
48.6%
% Gains From Reduced Conflict
–
1.4%
51.4%
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Table 4: Average Offers and Expenditures in the Non-Binding Treatment
Decision
Player
Offer > 0
Expenditure
1
14.9 (10.9)
24.9 (10.3)
Accept
2
14.9 (10.9)
22.9 (12.5)
1
9.1 (7.8)
26.8 (11.5)
Reject
2
9.1 (7.8)
28.6 (12.6)
Standard Deviation in Parentheses.

Table 5: Number of Offers, Rejections and Conflicts
Treatment
Binding
Non-Binding
# of Offers
540
540
# of Non-Zero Offers
540 (100%)
370 (68.5%)
# of Rejections
175 (32.5%) 156 (28.0%)
# of Non-Zero Rejections
175 (32.5%)
43 (11.6%)
# of Conflicts Avoided
365 (67.5%)
78 (14.4%)

Table 6: Offers, Accepted Offers and Rejected Offers
Treatment
Binding
Non-Binding
Average Offer
26.2 (4.4)
11.0 (12.3)
Average Accepted Offer
27.7 (3.2)
14.3 (12.7)
Average Accepted Offer (With No Entry)
27.7 (3.2)
24.8 (13.3)
Average Rejected Offer
23.3 (5.1)
2.4 (5.4)
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Histogram of Conflict Expenditures by Treatment with Gaussian Kernel-Density
Smoothing

Figure 2: Distribution of Bargaining Stage Offers by Treatment
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Appendix – Non-Binding Treatment
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research
agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them
closely and make appropriate decisions, you and the 11 other participants in this experiment can
earn an appreciable amount of money, which will be paid to you in CASH at the end of today’s
experiment.
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at
a rate of _30_ francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this
includes the $7 show up fee). The experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the
experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment using a bingo cage.
We will sum your total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s decisions. If you
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. The remainder of the instructions
will describe the decisions you may face in each period.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 1
At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a
group of 2 participants. The composition of your group will be changed randomly every period.
Each period will consist of two stages. In stage 1, you and the other participant in your group
will bargain for a reward. The reward is worth 60 francs to you and the other participant in your
group.
At the beginning of the first period, you will be randomly assigned either the role of
Proposer or the role of Responder. You will stay in the same role assignment for the first 15
periods and then change your role assignment for the last 15 periods of the experiment. Each
period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant of opposite assignment to form a
two-person group. So, if you are Proposer, each period you will be randomly re-paired with
another Responder. If you are Responder, each period you will be randomly re-paired with
another Proposer.
YOUR DECISION
In each period, the Proposer will have an opportunity to make an Offer to the Responder.
The Proposer may offer any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of the
Proposer’s decision screen is shown below.
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Once the Proposer has entered an offer and submitted that offer to the Responder, the
Responder will choose either to Accept or Reject the offer and also whether to enter stage 2 or
not. An example of the Responder’s decision screen is shown below.

EARNINGS
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder
receives a payment equal to the offer, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward minus the
amount of the offer:
Proposer Earnings
= 60 – Offer
Responder Earnings
= Offer
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If the Responder rejects the offer and decides not to enter stage 2, the Responder receives
a payment equal to 0, and the Proposer receives the 60 franc reward:
Proposer Earnings
= 60
Responder Earnings
=0
If the Responder accepts the offer and decides to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a
payment equal to the earnings from stage 2 plus the offer, and the Proposer receives the earnings
from stage 2 minus the offer:
Proposer Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2 – Offer
Responder Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2 + Offer
If the Responder rejects the offer and decides to enter stage 2, the Responder receives a
payment equal to the earnings from stage 2, and the Proposer receives the earnings from stage 2:
Proposer Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2
Responder Earnings
= Earnings in Stage 2
Note, if the Responder decides not to enter stage 2 (disregarding whether he accepts or
rejects the offer) then the period ends after stage 1. However, if the Responder decides to enter
stage 2 (disregarding whether he accepts or rejects the offer) both participants will enter stage 2.
In such a case both participants will bid for the 60 franc reward.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2
DECISION IN STAGE 2
In stage 2, each participant may bid for the 60 franc reward. You may bid any integer
number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of your decision screen is shown below.

EARNINGS IN STAGE 2
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are
calculated. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have to pay their bids.
Thus, your earnings in stage 2 will be calculated in the following way:
If you receive the reward:
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Earnings in Stage 2 = 60 – Your Bid
If you do not receive the reward:
Earnings in Stage 2 = 0 – Your Bid
Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 600
francs). Depending on a period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end
of the experiment we will randomly select 5 out of 30 periods for actual payment. You will sum
the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the earnings
are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the earnings are positive, we
will add them to your participation fee.
What Does my Bid Mean?
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other
participant in your group bids, the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each
franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws
randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other participant in the
group. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 60 francs. Thus, your chance of
receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of
francs you and the other participant in your group bids.
If both participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two
participants in the group.
Example of the Random Draw
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random
draw. If participant 1 bids 10 francs and participant 2 bids 20 francs, the computer assigns 10
lottery tickets to participant 1 and 20 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer randomly
draws one lottery ticket out of 30 (10 + 20). As you can see, participant 2 has higher chance of
receiving the reward: 0.67 = 20/30. Participant 2 has 0.33 = 10/30 chance of receiving the
reward.
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will
decide who receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on
your bid and whether you received the reward or not.
At the end of each period, the Proposer’s offer, whether the offer was accepted, whether
the Responder entered Stage 2, your bid, the other participant’s, whether you received the reward
or not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once
the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal
Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below.
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IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group.
At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with one other participant to
form a two-person group. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. However, if you are the
Proposer in stage 1, and the Responder decides not to enter stage 2, you will receive the reward.
Furthermore, if the experiment proceeds to stage 2 then by increasing your bid in stage 2, you
can increase your chance of receiving the reward. In stage 2, regardless of which participant
receives the reward, all participants must pay their bids.
Are there any questions?
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